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a minority, interfere in the internal affairs of a company, when the
irregularity could be cured by ratification by the majority. In this
case the Supreme Court of Canada, having held that the transfer
of shares was incidental to the incorporation of companies by the
Dominion, and therefore part of its internal management, should
I submit, have held that they could not interfere in a transaction
between two independent companies, which could be ratified by the
majority. Whether the deal was "just" or not is irrelevant. The only
question that should have been dealt with by the court was whether
the transaction was "legal". In my submission it was, and the "order
to the contrary" should not have been issued.
M.L.D.
C. CONFLICTS OF LAW
Samson v. Holden, [1963] S.C.R. 373.
On October 20, 1952, a Quebec man while driving his car in the
State of Maine crashed into another car being driven by a resident
of that state. As a result of the accident, the Maine driver died and
thereupon his wife and sons instituted an action for damages against
the Quebec driver in the Province of Quebec. By the law of Maine,
because the victim of the accident died intestate, the action had to be
taken in the name of an administrator. However, the widow and her
sons neglected to do this, though one of the sons, in fact, had been
appointed administrator.
In Samson v. Holden1 the Supreme Court of Canada upon these
facts affirmed the Court of Appeal in Quebec and held the defendant
Samson liable.
The main issue before the Court was whether the action was
enforceable by the plaintiffs from Maine in Quebec. This depended
on two subsidiary problems.
First, how was the court to characterize the law of Maine which
required the administrator to bring the action in his own name?
Fauteux J. who wrote the majority judgment came to the conclusion
that it was a matter of procedure and not capacity.
Je dirais que la pr~ponddrance de Ia preuve sur la loi du Maine 6tablit que
cette disposition de l'article 10 prescivant que l'action droit 8tre postde
par et au non du 'personal representative' en est une de prdcedure.
2
Taschereau J. who dissented stated it was a matter of capacity,
governed by the law of Maine. The learned judge in his judgment
adopted the view of Taschereau J. who likewise dissented in the Court
of Appeal of Quebec. Both judges chose to believe the expert witnesses
for the defendant who testified that the requirement of an administra-
tor was fundamental to the bringing of the action. The majority of
1 [19631 S.C.R. 373.
2 Ibid., at p. 380.
Supreme Court Review
the court on the other hand felt that they should not disturb these
findings of fact made in reference to the foreign law by the trial
judge. One is inevitably led to the conclusion that the foreign law
was characterized by the lex loci delicti.
The second question in relation to the main issue before the
Court was what rule of law applied to the case where the tort was
committed in the State of Maine but the action brought in the Prov-
ince of Quebec. Fauteux J. relied on the English common law rule
that in such a situation the tort must be actionable in Quebec and
unjustified in Maine where the action arose. The learned judge cited
the authority of McLean v. Pettigrew3 as an application of this prin-
ciple in the Province of Quebec. Whether this principle is appli-
cable in Quebec has been subject to much criticism by the text
writers and has been the result of frequent litigation. It has
been argued that the English principle does not apply in Quebec
because of Civil Code, Article 6(3), which has been interpreted to
mean that the lex loci delicti applies exclusively in a case of a tort
occurring in one state and action taken in another.4
Samson v. Holden thus reaffirms the view expressed by the Su-
preme Court of Canada on previous occasions that the English
principle operates in Quebec as well as the other Provinces.
J.G.W.
United States of America v. Harden, [1963] S.C.R. 366; 63 D.T.C.
1276; (1963) 41 D.L.R. (2d) 721; (1963) 44 W.W.R. 630.
In this decision, the Supreme Court of Canada speaking through
Cartwright J. restated the well-established principle that one country
does not enforce the revenue laws of another unless there is a specific
agreement to the contrary. It is submitted that this decision extends
the principle so that it now reads that one country will not enforce,
either directly or indirectly, the revenue judgments of another.
The appellant government was attempting to enforce a judgment
of an American district court for the recovery of over $600,000 in
income taxes against the respondent who had since become a resident
of the province of British Columbia. The case was brought to trial
in British Columbia' and an appeal was taken by the appellant to
the British Columbia Court of Appeal. 2 The Supreme Court of Canada
followed the two preceding courts and dismissed the appellant's claim.
3 [1945] S.C.R. 62.
4 On this subject see P. A. Cr~peau, De La Responsabilitd Civile Extra-
Contractuefle En Droit International Privd Qudbecois, (1961) 39 Can. Bar
Rev. 3.
1 (1961) 35 W.W.R. 654.
2 (1962) 40 W.W.R. 428.
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